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This article is a result of an invitation extended to Mr. Silets by
the members of the United States Sentencing Commission soliciting
his comments on the proposed sentencing guidelines for criminal
tax offenses. The Commission also invited comment on the general
structure and/or animating rationale of the Preliminary Draft of the
Sentencing Guidelines as issued by the Commission in September,
1986.1
This article addresses both issues: Section II discusses the gen-
eral structure and rationale of the Preliminary Draft, and identifies
the conceptual and practical difficulties that inhere in the concept of
"modified real offense sentencing" as applied under the draft guide-
lines. Section III discusses the guidelines that have been drafted for
tax offenses and explains how the aforementioned difficulties mani-
fest themselves in this specific area.
II. "MODIFIED REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING"
The preliminary guidelines operate under a system of modified
real offense sentencing that requires a judge to identify all relevant
offense characteristics. These include unlawful acts or omissions that
* Founding partner of the Chicago law firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd. J.D., Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1955; B.S.C., DePaul University, 1952.
** Associate with the firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd. J.D., Indiana University, 1981;
A.B.D., University of Kansas, 1972; M.A., Kent State University, 1971; B.A., Southwest-
ern Oklahoma State University, 1968.
1 See infra note 2.
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were done in furtherance of the crime of conviction, as well as
threatened, attempted, or completed injuries or harms that resulted
therefrom.2
2 United States Sentencing Commission, Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guide-
lines for the United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,085 (proposed Sept., 1986). The
Preliminary Draft is arranged in six chapters: Chapter One presents an "Introduction
and Overview", Chapter Two defines "Offense Conduct", Chapter Three discusses "Of-
fender Characteristics", Chapter Four is devoted to "Determining the Sentence", Chap-
ter Five addresses "Violations of Parole and Supervised Release", and Chapter Six
discusses such "Other Issues" as fines, organizational sanctions, plea agreements and
offense values for multiple crimes.
As will be discussed in more detail, the Preliminary Draft is predicated upon "modi-
fied real offense sentencing" and upon the mathematical calculation of sentences by
means of a series of "offense values" and "offender characteristics." See id. at 35,085-88.
"Modified real offense sentencing" is discussed infra at notes 46-54 and accompanying
text, along with the Draft's allocation of the burdens of proof and persuasion and its
reliance upon the preponderance of the evidence standard.
The process by which a particular sentence is determined is described as follows:
The court should follow the steps set forth below to determine sentence:
1. Determine what statutes the offender has been convicted of violating.
2. Refer to the Statutory Index and determine which section of Chapter Two [of-
fense conduct] applies. If more than one section of Chapter Two is referenced,
refer to each section and any application commentary to determine which is most
appropriate to the offense before the court.
3. If the applicable section contains more than one base offense value, select the
highest value that applies. Add special offense characteristics where applicable.
4. If the section contains a cross reference to one or more other sections, refer to
those sections and proceed as in step 3 above.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 for each offense of conviction.
6. When all offenses have been scored, total the offense value.
7. Refer to Chapter Three [offender characteristics] for applicable adjustments in
offense value(s). After applying an adjustment, always round down to the nearest
whole number.
8. Apply an adjustment for role in the offense (Chapter Three, Part A). If the
offender is convicted of more than one offense and plays different roles in each
offense, determine which offense values apply to which offenses and apply the ad-
justment separately to each. Total the offense values after they have been adjusted,
rounding down to the nearest whole number.
9. Determine whether the offender is entitled to an adjustment for post offense
conduct (Chapter Three, Part B). If so, multiply the adjusted offense value from
step 8 by the adjustment for post-offense conduct, rounding down to the nearest
whole number.
10. Apply an adjustment for criminal history (Chapter Three, Part C) and multiply
the adjusted offense value from step 9 by that adjustment, rounding down to the
nearest whole number.
11. The new total is the offender's sanction unit score.
12. Refer to Chapter Four to determine the sentence.
As an example, the base offense value for homicide "level two," which is the offense
of murder as committed in situations other than those involving terrorist acts, airplane
hijackings and/or the assassination of a President or President elect, is 240. Id. at
35,089. If the offense involved the death of a government employee who was killed in or
because of the performance of his or her official duties, then 36 is added to the base
offense value. Id. If, however, the offense resulted from "reckless conduct that rises to
the level of malice," then 100 is subtracted from the base offense value. Id.
The sentencing officer then proceeds to consider the offender characteristics that
are listed in Chapter Three. See infra note 48. Once the appropriate adjustment has
been made for offender characteristics, such as prior criminal history and role in the
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According to the Commentary that was provided for this por-
tion of the draft, the Commission was faced with the initial decision
as to "whether to base its sentencing guidelines upon the real con-
duct in which the offender engaged or only the conduct for which
the offender was convicted. ' 3 The Commission chose the former
alternative because it felt that modified real offense sentencing was
essential for the implementation of the new sentencing goals estab-
lished by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 4
The Sentencing Reform Act redefined federal sentencing goals
because Congress concluded that "[i]n the Federal system today,
criminal sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation
offense, the sentencing officer proceeds to determine sentence, based on the offender's
"sanction unit score." 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,085.
For imprisonment, the Draft provides a table that transforms "sanction units" into
months of imprisonment. Id. at 35,120-21. Assume that an offender was convicted of
level two homicide, which carries a base offense value of 240 and that the offense was
committed under circumstances entitling the offender to the 100 point deduction for
"reckless conduct." A base offense score of 140 results. If the offender's prior criminal
history required an upward adjustment of 9 (based on years served for prior offenses),
then the final offense value, or sanction unit score, is 149. When this score is applied to
the sanction unit table, it results in the imposition of a sentence of between "133-164"
months of imprisonment. Id.
Although values differ for each offense, this analysis applies in every instance. For
most offenses, the basic guideline includes cross references to other conduct that must
be included in calculating the base offense value. See, e.g., id. at 35,084. In the example
above, the cross references are (a) if the victim suffered psychological injury, and (b) if
the death occurred in the course of another offense. Id. If either factor is present, then
the offense value for that factor is added to the base offense value. Id. (Psychological
injury is the subject of a separate guidelines and can add from 48 to 12 points to the
base offense value.) Id. at 35,093-94.
The Preliminary Draft also notes that "[tihe following offenses are excluded in de-
termining an offender's sentence under the guidelines:
1. conduct for which the offender has already been fully sanctioned;
2. conduct for which further prosecution is barred."
Id. at 35,086.
3 Id. at 35,086.
4 The rejected alternative is "a charge of conviction offense system (which] consid-
ers only those elements of behavior that formed part of the charge of which the offender
was convicted." Id.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which is contained in Title II of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, established the following goals for federal criminal
sentencing:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medi-
cal care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner....
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985)(effective Nov.
1, 1987)(added by Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1989 (1984) and amended
by Pub. L. 99-217, §§ 2 & 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)). See also 51 Fed. Reg. at 35.
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model." 5
Recent studies suggest that this approach has failed, and most
sentencing judges ... agree that the rehabilitation model is not an
appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know too little about
human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine ba-
sis .... Until the present sentencing statutes are changed ... judges
... are left to exercise their discretion to carry out what each believes
to be the purposes of sentencing.
6
Although dissatisfied with the rehabilitative ideal, Congress did not
consider it to be the critical flaw in the present system.
The critical flaw, according to Congress, was "the judge fac-
tor."7 The "judge factor" is the role that judicial discretion plays in
the articulation and imposition of sentences.
[E]ach judge is left to apply his own notions of the purposes of sen-
tencing. As a result, every day Federal judges mete out an unjustifi-
5 S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983). Senate Report No. 225 was
issued to accompany S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), which was a proposed Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that was passed by the Senate on February 2,
1984. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3184-85. Much of Title II of the
enacted Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was derived from the provisions of
S. 1762. See id.
Attorney General William French Smith appeared before the Senate Committee
and offered the following comments on the importance of sentencing reform:
Of the improvements [under consideration by the Committee]... perhaps the most
important are those related to sentencing criminal offenders. These provisions in-
troduce a totally new and comprehensive sentencing system that is based upon a
coherent philosophy. They rely upon detailed guidelines for sentencing similarly
situated offenders in order to provide for a greater certainty and uniformity in
sentencing.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983).
6 Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). The report also includes the following comments on
the unreliability of the rehabilitative ideal:
The judge is supposed to set the maximum term of imprisonment and the Parole
Commission is to determine when to release the prisoner because he is "rehabili-
tated." Yet almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that
rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now quite certain
that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated.
Id. at 38. And the report goes on to criticize indeterminate sentencing:
The sentencing provisions of current law were originally based on a rehabilitation
model in which the sentencing judge was expected to sentence a defendant to a
fairly long term of imprisonment .... The Parole Commission was charged with
setting his release date if it concluded that he was sufficiently rehabilitated. At pres-
ent, the concepts of indeterminate sentencing and parole release depend for their
justification exclusively upon this model of "coercive" rehabilitation, the theory of
correction that ties prison release dates to the successful completion of certain voca-
tional, educational, and counseling programs within the prisons.
Id. at 40. For a theoretical discussion of the reasons for the decline of "the rehabilitative
ideal," see F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILrrATIvE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981). Allen also discusses the reasons for the increased popularity of
punishment as retribution, or what he calls "just deserts." See id.; see also M. FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977).
7 S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1983).
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ably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar histories,
convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.
One offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another con-
victed of the very same crime and possessing a comparable criminal
history may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment....
These disparities.., can be traced directly to the unfettered dis-
cretion the law confers on ... judges .... This sweeping discretion
flows from the lack of any statutory guidance or review procedures to
which courts ... might look.8
In order to eliminate disparities resulting from the conjoint ef-
fects of the rehabilitative ideal and the "judge factor," Congress set
out to create a system which would ensure that sentences were con-
sistent within certain parameters.9 The system that resulted is
founded upon determinate sentencing and a new concept, the sen-
8 Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). The original version of the quoted passage includes
references to the Parole Commission, to which is attributed the responsibility for dispar-
ities in sentence implementation. See id. These references were deleted because they are
irrelevant to the point at issue.
The drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act described the goals of the new measure
in a report issued by the Committee on the Judiciary: "The bill's sweeping provisions
are designed to structure judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate indeterminate sen-
tencing, phase out parole release, and make criminal sentencing fairer and more cer-
tain." S. Rep. No. 223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1983). The report accompanying the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 included the following comment in its dis-
cussion of the necessity for the implementation of sentencing guidelines: "Recent stud-
ies indicate that sentences too often reflect the personal attitudes and practices of
individual sentencing judges." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 n.72 (1983).
9 This undertaking is predicated upon the assumption that sentencing disparities
are inherently undesirable; this assumption results from the rejection of the rehabilita-
tive ideal.
The rehabilitative ideal required that sentences reflect the pertinent idiosyncrasies
of offenders and their offenses, because it conceptualized criminality as analogous to
illness and susceptible to similar treatment. This conceptualization led to the assump-
tion that there was an optimally "interventionist" sentence for each offender, and that
the determination of this sentence was the province of the particular judge who had an
opportunity to observe the offender and to inquire into his character and the circum-
stances of his offense. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 513-20
(1973); D. MELOSSI & M. PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENI-
TErTARY SYSTEM (1981); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLuM: SOCIAL ORDER
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971). See also People ex reL Forsyth v. Court of
Sessions of Monroe County, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894)(upholding court's "in-
herent" power to suspend sentence in the presence of mitigating factors).
Although idiosyncratic sentencing is an essential element of the rehabilitative ideal,
the rejection of the latter neither requires nor permits the rejection of the former. The
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" has been inter-
preted to require that sentences be proportionate to the offense. Even the retributive
ideal is predicated upon the concept of "just deserts," achieving some parity between
the offense and the punishment imposed. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284
(1983); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted-" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839, 844 (1969). Indeed, the new act requires that the sentencing officer
consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant." Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. III
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tencing guidelines.10
1985)(effective Nov. 1, 1987)(added by Pub.L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1989
(1984) and amended by Pub. L. 99-217, §§ 2 & 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1986)).
It is this issue, the necessity for achieving some parity between the offense and the
punishment imposed, that the Preliminary Draft fails to resolve. How can "modified
real offense sentencing" achieve consistency and objectivity through the implementation
of "categorical" sentences without sacrificing the idiosyncratic parity that is required by
the eighth amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)?
The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act reveals that, although the
drafters rejected the rehabilitative ideal, they retained the concept of parity.
The Committee does not intend that the [sentencing] guidelines be imposed in a
mechanistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to con-
sider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guide-
lines in an appropriate case. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide
a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an
individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized
sentences.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983). The conflict between the language
that is quoted above and the language that was quoted earlier, in the discussion of Con-
gress' commitment to consistency and objectivity in sentencing, is not a matter that can
be resolved in this essay. The purpose of this essay is, among other things, to point out
the existence of the conflict, to suggest that the Commission consider the need to tem-
per justice with mercy, and to consider modifying the guidelines to facilitate "the
thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences."
10 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985)(added by Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 217(a),
98 Stat. 2017 (1984) and amended by Pub. L. 99-22, § 1(1), 99 Stat. 46 (1985)), provides
that the Sentencing Commission is to "establish sentencing policies and practices" that
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexi-
bility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process....
See also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. III 1985)("Duties of the Commission"). The court, in
imposing sentence, is to consider the appropriate guidelines and directives that have
been issued by the Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. III 1985)(effective
Nov. 1, 1987)(added by Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1989 (1984)).
"The Commission is established as an independent commission in the judicial
branch, consisting of seven voting members appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1983).
"In addition to the seven voting members, the Commission [has] one permanent non
voting ex officio member, the Attorney General or his designee, and.., one temporary
non-voting ex officio member, the Chairman of the United States Parole Commission."
Id. at 160.
The Commission has been given "twenty one specific powers... that may be exer-
cised by majority vote of the members present and voting .... Id. at 181; see also 28
U.S.C. § 995(a) (Supp. III 1985). The Commission has also been given the "power
to... perform such other functions as are required to permit Federal courts to meet
their responsibilities under section 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code, and to per-
mit others involved in the Federal criminal justice system to meet their related responsi-
bilities." 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(22) (Supp. III 1985).
"The sentencing guidelines to be developed by the Sentencing Commission are at
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A. PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES
A primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of unwar-
the heart of the congressional effort to curtail... judicial discretion, mitigate disparities
in sentencing and inject more predictability into the process." Rezneck, The New Federal
Criminal Sentencing Provisions, 22 AM. CraM. L. REv. 785, 786 (1985). See also supra note 8.
In adopting a "a determinate sentencing system with sentencing guidelines," Con-
gress was following an example set by the state of Minnesota. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1983). At the time the new legislation was drafted, Minnesota was
the only state that was operating under such a system. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 244.04, .05, .08, .09 & .10 (West Supp. 1983)). The National Academy of Sciences
conducted a study which concluded that
the Minnesota sentencing reform had been more successful than any other State or
local reform effort in . . .reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity, increasing
emphasis on punishment for violent offenders, and avoiding unintended burdens
on the prison system....
The ... study concluded that the Minnesota sentencing guidelines system was
more successful in changing sentencing behavior to reduce unwarranted sentencing
disparities for three reasons. First, the sentencing guidelines were required by leg-
islation rather than adopted voluntarily by the courts. Second, the guidelines pre-
scribed what sentencing behavior ought to be rather than merely describing past
sentencing practices. And third, the Minnesota statute included a mechanism avail-
ability of appellate review of all sentences outside the guidelines to assure judicial
compliance with the guidelines. The study also found that Minnesota was able to
create a model of its criminal sentencing system that permitted it to test the impact
of any given set of sentencing guidelines on its prison system, thus enabling it to
fashion guidelines that avoided any unintended impact on the prison system.
Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted) (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PANEL ON SENTENC-
ING RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (A. Blumstein, J.
Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds. 1983).
The Minnesota sentencing guidelines are predicated upon the following premises:
(a) that sentencing should be neutral "with respect to ... race, gender, social or eco-
nomic status"; (b) that the severity of sentencing sanctions should be directly propor-
tionate to offense severity and to the offender's criminal history; (c) that "incarcerative
sanctions should be limited to those convicted of more serious offenses or those who
have longer criminal histories"; and (d) that "departures from the presumptive
sentences established in the guidelines should be made only when substantial and com-
pelling circumstances exist." Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 16
MINN. STAT. ANN. app. § I, at 299 (West Supp. 1987). To achieve these ends, the Minne-
sota guidelines are predicated upon a sentencing grid: "The presumptive sentence...
is determined by locating the appropriate cell of the Sentencing Guidelines Grid. The
grid represents the two dimensions most important in current sentencing and releasing
decisions offense severity and criminal history." Id., § II, at 300.
The sentencing grid is used to prescribe an offender's "presumptive sentence
length[] in months," and ranges from a possible "one year and one day" sentence for
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to a possible 324 month sentence for second degree
murder "with intent." Id., § IV, at 330. (First degree murder is excluded from the
guidelines because a state statute imposes a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
Id., § II.A, at 300.) The grid also determines whether the sentence is "presumptive
commitment to state imprisonment" or whether it can include time in jail or non-jail
time characterized by specified conditions of probation. Id., § IV, at 300. Both the grid
and the guidelines apply only to felonies. Id., § I, at 299.
The grid is used to determine the offense severity level, which can range from I to
X. The second factor is determined by calculating the offender's "criminal history index
score." "[T]he offender is assigned one point for every felony conviction for which a
felony sentence was stayed or imposed before the current sentencing.... ." Id., § II.B.1,
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ranted sentencing disparity. The [Act] requires the judge, before im-
posing sentence, to consider the history and characteristics of the
offender, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the pur-
poses of sentencing. He is then to determine which sentencing guide-
lines and policy statements apply to the case. Either he may decide
that the guideline recommendation appropriately reflects the offense
and offender characteristics and impose sentence according to the
guideline recommendation or he may conclude that the guidelines fail
to reflect adequately a pertinent aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance and impose sentence outside the guidelines. A sentence
outside the guidelines is appealable, with the appellate court directed
to determine whether the sentence is reasonable. Thus, the [Act]
seeks to assure that most cases will result in sentences within the
guideline range and that sentences outside the guidelines will be im-
posed only in appropriate cases.1l
at 302. Points are only assigned for convictions within the last fifteen years. Id.,
§ II.B.l.d, at 303.
One point is added if the offender was "on probation or parole or confined in ajail,
workhouse, or prison ... or released pending sentencing at the time the felony was
committed .. " Id., § II.B.2, at 305. Offenders are assigned one unit for each misde-
meanor conviction and two units for each "gross misdemeanor conviction"; four units
equal one point on the criminal history index. Id., § II.B.3, at 307. Offenders are as-
signed "one point for every two offenses committed and prosecuted as a juvenile that
would have been felonies if committed by an adult .... Id., § II.B.4, at 309.
The Minnesota Supreme Court developed a "sentencing worksheet" which courts
must use in determining a particular offender's status on the sentencing grid. MINN.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II(B)(4) at 329 (1985)(amended 1986).
The worksheet includes sections for categorizing past and present offenses. Id. The
section devoted to present offenses lists several "conviction offense modifiers," which
include "attempt," "conspiracy," "firearm used" and/or "other dangerous weapon
used/firearm possessed." Id. For a discussion of the substantive provisions of the Min-
nesota guidelines, see infra note 48.
The authors are convinced that the Minnesota guidelines have played an important
role in the formulation of the Preliminary Draft both because of the Senate Report's
reference to the Minnesota system and because an individual who was research director
on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission is on the staff of the United States
Sentencing Commission. Although there are dissimilarities between the two systems, it
is apparent that the Minnesota guidelines had an influence on the Preliminary Draft.
The general structure of the two systems is similar. Both systems rely on mathemat-
ical calculations as the means for determining the offender's "presumptive sentence."
See id., § IV, at 329. The Preliminary Draft substitutes a table of sentence lengths for the
Minnesota sentencing grid, but the general analysis involved in the two procedures is
strikingly analogous. Each system predicates its calculations on offense and offender
characteristics, and both emphasize that what the Minnesota system refers to as the
"presumptive sentence" is to be imposed absent compelling considerations to the con-
trary. See id., §§ II(A)-(D).
I I S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983)(footnotes omitted).
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [established by
the Sentencing Commission] unless the court finds that an aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a
sentence different from that described [therein].
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. III 1985)(effective Nov. 1, 1987)(added by Pub. L. 98-473,
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A subsequent enactment, the Sentencing Guidelines Act of
1986,12 "provide[d] the... Sentencing Commission [with] limited,
additional discretion in the promulgation of sentencing guide-
lines." -3 The legislative history for this measure described the
Commission's role as follows:
14
The [Sentencing Reform] Act requires a sentencing judge to impose a
sentence authorized by the applicable sentencing guideline. A judge
may go outside the applicable guideline, but only if [he] finds ... an
aggravating or mitigating factor that was not adequately considered
when the guidelines were formulated and that should lead to a sen-
tence different from that called for by the applicable guideline. The
judge, moreover, is not encouraged to go outside of the applicable guideline, for if
the judge does, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal the sentence. It is clearly
intended that judges will confine their exercise of discretion to choosing a point
within the range (if any) specified in the applicable guideline. Thus, the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act really vests most of the sentencing discretion in the United States
Sentencing Commission, the body responsible for drafting the sentencing
guidelines. 15
tit. 2, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1989 (1984) and amended by Pub. L. 99-217, §§ 2 & 4, 99
Stat. 1728 (1985)).
12 Pub. L. 99-363, 100 Stat. 770 (1986).
13 H.R. Rep. No. 99-614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
14 No Senate Report was issued for this enactment; the quoted material is excerpted
from the HouseJudiciary Committee Report accompanying H.R. 4801, the measure that
became the Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1986. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
1762 (1986).
15 H.R. Rep. No. 99-614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1986)(footnotes omitted and em-
phasis added). See also id. at 4 ("The Act... places.., limitations on the Commission's
discretion, but these limitations do not seriously restrict the Commission or prevent it
from issuing such guidelines as it deems appropriate.").
In the passage that immediately precedes the above quoted material, the report
notes that although the Act appears to give the judge greater control over the punish-
ment that is meted out, by abolishing parole and halving good time credit, "other provi-
sions of the Sentencing Reform Act reduce judicial control." Id. at 2.
Although the Act does not specifically authorize appeals from sentences that are
within the applicable guideline(s), it appears that such appeals are possible. See, e.g., id.
at 3 n.8.; Conyers, Unresolved Issued in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, 32 FED. B. NEws &
J. 68, 69-70 (1985).
The Sentencing Commission is specifically charged with accomplishing "two basic
purposes," which are codified at 28 U.S.C. section 991(b) and described in the legisla-
tive history as follows:
The most important purpose of the Commission is the establishment of sentencing
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that are designed to
meet three goals.
First, the policies and practices established should assure that, to the maximum
extent possible, the Federal sentencing practices and policies carry out the four pur-
poses of sentencing set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code.
These purposes are deterrence, protection of the public from further crimes by the
defendant, assurance ofjust punishment, and promotion of rehabilitation.
Second, the policies and practices are required to provide certainty and fairness
in meeting the purposes of sentencing....
Third, the sentencing policies and practices are required to reflect, to the ex-
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Judges are "not encouraged to go outside of the applicable
guideline," therefore, judicial discretion will be confined to apply-
ing the appropriate guideline(s).16 The constraints on judicial dis-
cretion will transform sentencing into a formalistic exercise
predicated upon the assessment of "offender characteristics," "of-
fense severity" ratings and permutations thereof. Because the sen-
tencing guidelines are the final arbiter of this process, they must be
tent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior in the context of the
criminal justice process....
The second basic purpose of the United States Sentencing Commission is to
develop means of ensuring the effectiveness of different sentencing, penal, and cor-
rectional practices in meeting the purposes of sentencing set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of Title 18.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62.
16 The validity of this conclusion is reinforced by the statement which the President
issued upon signing the Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1986. See U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1770-71 (1986). The Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 994(b), which is con-
cerned with guidelines that "establish a sentencing range" for a particular offense. As
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) provides that
[i]f a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the max-
imum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that
range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the [minimum] term
of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (Supp. III 1985)(amended by Pub. L. 99-363, 100 Stat. 770
(1986)(emphasis added and technical correction included). See, e.g., statement of Presi-
dent Reagan upon signing H.R. 4801, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1770-71 (1986).
The original version provided that the maximum of the range was not to exceed the
minimum "by more than 25 per centum." See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (Supp. III 1985)(ad-
ded by Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2019 (1984)).
The amendment was prompted by concern that the "25% rule" would "creat[e]
problems for the Commission in drafting guidelines calling for short terms of imprison-
ment," the concern being that "the 25% rule would result in such a proliferation of
guideline ranges that it would be virtually impossible to draw enough meaningful dis-
tinctions to justify all of the guideline ranges." H.R. Rep. 99-614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1986). The amendment was also prompted by the concern that there was "no way to
compute the minimum term of imprisonment in a range where the maximum term is life
imprisonment." Id. at 6 (quoting Testimony of William W. Wilkins, Jr. before the HouseJudici-
ary Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, on H.R. 4801, at 3 (1986)).
In approving the amendment, President Reagan issued a statement, the language of
which reveals the minimal role that judicial discretion is to play under the new sentenc-
ing scheme.
I am today approving H.R. 4801, but I do so with serious reservations.... The
purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, which I submitted to the Congress as part of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, was to establish a determinate sen-
tencing system with narrow sentencing ranges for criminal offenses. The range of up
to six months provided in this bill is far in excess of what we visualized in 1983 and, if imple-
mented by the Sentencing Commission, would restore an undue measure of discretion to judges
that could threaten to undermine the core purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act to establish
fairness and certainty in sentencing by confining judicial discretion within a relatively narrow
range.
Statement by President Reagan upon signing H.R. 4801, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1770-71 (1986)(emphasis added). It is difficult in light of the present system to
understand why a range of six months represents the bestowing of "an undue measure
of discretion" upon sentencing judges.
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drafted to avoid uncertainty, ambiguity and bias toward either the
prosecution or the defense, while aggressively promoting the funda-
mental requirements of due process and ensuring that humanistic
and policy considerations play some role in the imposition of penal
sanctions.
This is, of course, a Herculean task. 17 This article points out
certain respects in which the Sentencing Commission has not car-
ried out its task to its necessary fruition. The next section below
discusses these issues and explains why they are matters of great
concern to those who represent defendants in federal criminal
proceedings.
B. BURDENS OF PROOF AND PERSUASION
The sentencing guidelines are intended to transform sentenc-
ing into an exercise unenlightened by the interposition of judicial
idiosyncracy. The realization of this ambition requires (1) a com-
plete restructuring of the policies and practices of the federal sen-
tencing system, since that system is and always has been predicated
upon the concept ofjudicial discretion, and/or (2) a careful evalua-
tion of existing policies and practices to determine which, if any,
are constitutionally acceptable in the absence of discretionary
sentencing.
The former alternative represents an undertaking of gigantic
magnitude. Although the Preliminary Draft is offered as the suc-
cessful culmination of this undertaking, it founders upon the rocks
of the second alternative. That is, the central defect of the Prelimi-
nary Draft is that it attempts to retain practices and doctrines that
were developed for a system of discretionary sentencing. Because
these concepts were designed to assist a judicial officer in the in-
formed exercise of his sentencing discretion, they are animated by
considerations that are necessarily different from, and often anti-
thetical to, the considerations that inhere in the new, determinate
sentencing system.
This proposition is best illustrated by means of an example, and
the best example is the Draft's allocation of the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion:
In determining the appropriate sentence under these guidelines, the
court may rely on any information produced at trial, in the
presentence report, or at the sentencing hearing that the court finds is
supported by a preponderance of the evidence .... 18
17 For one commentator's assessment of "the magnitude of the task facing the Sen-
tencing Commission," see Rezneck, supra note 10, at 788-90.
18 The omitted material is a citation to 18 U.S.C. § 3577, which was redesignated,
1080 SILETS AND BRENNER [Vol. 77
1. The court may find that an offense characteristic exists or an ad-
justment factor applies if a preponderance of the evidence supports
such finding.
2. The burdens of production and persuasion as to the existence of
an offense characteristic or an adjustment factor shall be on the gov-
ernment unless the offense characteristic or adjustment factor miti-
gates the potential sentence in which case the burdens of production
and persuasion shall be on the offender. 19
The Commentary informs us that the "less demanding" preponder-
ance of the evidence standard was chosen over "either the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard used to determine the defendant's guilt
or a clear and convincing evidence standard" because
[t]he use of the preponderance standard at sentencing was recently
upheld in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
In McMillan, the Court examined a Pennsylvania statute that permitted
a judge to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for
specific felonies when the judge found by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the offender "visibly possessed a firearm."
The Court found that establishment of the preponderance stan-
dard was permissible under the Due Process clause, and noted that
"sentencing courts have always operated without constitutionally im-
posed burdens of proof; embracing petitioners' suggestion that we ap-
ply the clear and convincing standard here would significantly alter
criminal sentencing, for we see no way to distinguish the visible pos-
session finding at issue here from a host of other express or implied
findings sentencing judges typically make on the way to passing
sentence." 20
As support for its holding that "[s]entencing courts have tradition-
ally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden
of proof at all," the McMillan Court relied upon Williams v. New
York. 2t
1. Williams v. New York
Williams v. New York 22 involved a challenge to the imposition of
the death penalty. Ajury found Samuel Titto Williams guilty of first
degree murder and recommended that he be sentenced to life im-
prisonment.23 The recommendation was not binding upon the
effective November 1, 1987, as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 by the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,085. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3557 (1982) provides that
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, charac-
ter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
19 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,085.
20 Id. (quoting McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2420 n.8).
21 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 242-44.
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court, which was authorized to impose the death penalty notwith-
standing the jury's recommendation. 24  The court sentenced Wil-
liams to death.25 In imposing the sentence, "the judge gave reasons
why he felt that the death sentence should be imposed." 26 The
"reasons" included "the shocking details of the crime, as shown by
trial evidence" and additional information that had not been
presented to the jury but that was presented to the court in the re-
port of the pre-sentence investigation. 27
Although Williams did not contest "[tihe accuracy of the state-
ments made by the judge as to [his] background and past practices,"
he did attack the sentence as having been imposed in violation of
the requirements of due process. 28 The Supreme Court rejected his
challenge in a thoughtful opinion that analyzed the evidentiary and
procedural considerations implicated in imposing "sentence upon
an already convicted defendant." 29
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts
in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sen-
tencingjudge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types
of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law ....
The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cate-
gory calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life
and habits of a particular offender .... Today's philosophy of individ-
ualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between first
and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences ... have ... taken
the place of the old rigidly fixed punishments .... Retribution is no
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and
rehabilitation ... have become important goals of criminal jurispru-
dence ....
[I]ndeterminate sentences and probation have resulted in an in-
crease in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments....
[A] strong motivating force for the[se] changes has been the belief that
by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders
many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete
freedom and useful citizenship.5 0
In the above-quoted excerpts and in the even more lengthy
analysis contained in the opinion, the Court made it very apparent
24 Id.
25 Id. at 244.
26 Id.
27 Id. The "additional information" concerned Williams' involvement in "'thirty
other burglaries in and about the same vicinity' where the murder had been committed"
and "certain activities ... as shown by the probation report that indicated [that Wil-
liams] possessed 'a morbid sexuality' and classified him as a 'menace to society.'" Id.
28 Id. at 244-45.
29 Id. at 244.
30 Id. at 246-50 (citations omitted).
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that its ruling was predicated upon a sentencing scheme the central
features of which were judicial discretion and indeterminate sen-
tencing as the instrument for effecting rehabilitation and reforma-
tion.31 In this scheme, since discarded by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, the sentencing officer's role is analogous to that of a
treating physician. The judge's obligation is to "diagnose" the
sources and circumstances of the offender's propensity for malefac-
tion and then to impose a sentence that is optimally calculated to
eliminate this propensity and restore the offender "to complete
freedom and useful citizenship. " 32
Because the judge's role is that of diagnostician, he must be
provided with complete information about the offender's back-
ground and potential for rehabilitation. Only then can he formulate
a sentence that is calculated to achieve the desired ends.
2. Williams and the Preliminary Draft
Williams' holding was delivered in a factual context that was very
different from that which would exist if the guidelines of the Prelimi-
nary Draft were implemented. Under the guidelines, and under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, sentencing is no longer an exercise
in discretion, rather, it is an exercise in calculation. The sentencing
officer is required to calculate the offender's score on a variety of
pertinent characteristics and then, through a mathematical exercise,
determine the sentence that must be imposed.33
Under the new guidelines, Williams' "additional information"
ceases to be a resource to be used by ajudicial officer in the exercise
of his informed discretion and becomes the determinant of the sen-
tence that will be imposed. Under the old system, the sound judg-
ment of the sentencing officer was a reliable check on any potential
abuse of the information because he controlled sentencing and was
therefore free to disregard or use the "additional information" as he
saw fit.34 This discretion permitted the relaxation of certain eviden-
tiary and procedural requirements. Under the proposed guidelines,
however, "additional information" becomes evidence that is
presented at what would certainly become an adversarial proceed-
ing, the sentencing hearing.
The premise of the old sentencing paradigm was that informa-
tion was provided to the court to assist it in the inforined exercise of
31 See id.
32 Id. at 249. See also id. at 248 nn.10 & 13; id. at 249 n.14.
33 See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,085.
34 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 38-56 (1983).
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its sentencing discretion. Under the new paradigm, as represented
by the proposed guidelines, the purpose of the information is dra-
matically changed. The parties are invited to present evidence relat-
ing to aggravating or mitigating factors. Although it is not spelled
out in the guidelines, once the government has presented evidence
supporting the existence of aggravating factors, it logically follows
that the burden necessarily shifts to the defendant to rebut the gov-
ernment's evidence.
This shift in the burden of proof, coupled with the provisions of
18 U.S.C. section 3661, 35 puts the defendant in a perilous position.
The Commentary states that the preponderance of the evidence
standard comes into play "[w]hen a sentencing fact is disputed."36
The government is free to introduce any and all evidence of "the
background, character, and conduct" of a convicted defendant.3 7
Does this mean that the defendant faces the sentencing equivalent
of a directed verdict if he does not, and cannot, introduce evidence
controverting the evidence that has been submitted in support of
aggravation? Or, does it mean that the court is free to ignore un-
controverted evidence under some as-yet unexplicated standard?3 8
The Commentary also notes that "[t]he judge may admit all evi-
dence that is relevant and reliable except for evidence that is barred
by evidentiary rules." 39 The crucial question is "relevant to what?"
As the Williams Court noted:
Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which nar-
rowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to the
particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity to
prevent a time consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues.
They were also designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with
the issue of guilt of a particular offense from being influenced to con-
vict for that offense by evidence that the defendant had habitually en-
gaged in other misconduct .... A sentencing judge, however, is not
confined to the narrow issue of guilt.40
Because the new sentencing paradigm rejects judicial discretion and
the rehabilitative ideal, a judge no longer can rely upon these con-
cepts as the rationale for conducting a free-wheeling inquiry into the
nature of the offender's character. This means, therefore, that the
35 See supra note 18.
36 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,088.
37 Id.
38 If this is the intention, then the Preliminary Draft has retained the concept ofjudi-
cial discretion despite its ambitions and instructions to the contrary.
39 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,088.
40 337 U.S. at 246-47.
SILETS AND BRENNER
new sentencing paradigm must articulate equivalent concepts to
guide the conduct of the sentencing inquiry.
Absent the articulation of such concepts, the reference to "rele-
vant" evidence becomes meaningless. If the guidelines are going to
be meaningful and practicable, they must define the scope of the
inquiry at the sentencing hearing. Otherwise, the government will
be free to introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character and
thereby require the defendant to refute whatever has been said
against him or face the equivalent of a directed verdict on the issue
of aggravation. Such a result could turn the sentencing hearing into
an instrument of abuse.
This problem raises a related issue, namely, whether the judge's
determination, as a fact-finder, will be subject to appellate review
under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. Assume the following
hypothetical circumstances: At the sentencing hearing, the govern-
ment puts in "some" evidence of the existence of aggravating fac-
tors; the defendant is unable or elects not to put in controverting
evidence, and the court imposes an aggravated sentence based upon
the evidence adduced by the government. Can the defendant then
seek appellate review, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support the imposition of an aggravated sentence? If so, what stan-
dard will be used to determine whether the evidence was suffi-
cient?4 1 What, in other words, is necessary to establish a prima facie
41 If appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is not permissible, then the
Preliminary Draft effectively reinstates discretionary sentencing without, however, in-
cluding the moderating effects of a sentencing system that is predicated upon a commit-
ment to rehabilitation and its attendant guarantees. That is, if no review is permitted,
then the defendant is thrown to the ungoverned mercies of the government and of the
sentencing court. Although the court may be constrained by the number of offender
and offense characteristics that are conceivably relevant to the matter that is before it,
the court could predicate findings of aggravating factors upon little or no evidence,
thereby imposing a sentence that is far harsher than is actually warranted.
In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress was concerned about
"the judge factor," the frequency with which sentences reflect the predilections of par-
ticularjurists rather than the objective realities of the offense and the harm inflicted. See,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-56 (1983). Assuming, arguendo, that "the
judge factor" can and should be eliminated, the fact remains that the Preliminary Draft
fails to do so. If there is no appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence support-
ing a particular sentence determination, then, under the circumstances assumed herein
and in the text above, judges will be free to indulge their predilections by manipulating
their findings on certain criteria, including aggravating and mitigating factors.
Assume, for example, that a particular judge has a strong "prosecution bias." That
judge is therefore likely to utilize a very low evidentiary threshold for finding the exist-
ence of aggravating factors. As a result, his sentences will be more severe than those
imposed by a "defense oriented" judge who requires a substantial evidentiary founda-
tion before he will incorporate aggravating factors into his sentences.
Perhaps it is impossible to eliminate all vestiges of idiosyncratic sentencing, and it
may undesirable to do so. The author's concern, however, is that the Preliminary Draft
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"case" in aggravation or, for that matter, in mitigation? If review is
available, is it necessary to make the equivalent of a motion for di-
rected verdict at- the close of the government's "case" in order to
avail oneself of that possibility for relief?
Further, is discovery available to assist the parties in their re-
spective roles in the sentencing hearing? That is, can the defendant
obtain discovery from the government (a) in aid of his attempting to
establish the existence of mitigating factors and/or (b) to enable
him to rebut government-adduced evidence of aggravating factors?
The determination of the discovery issue requires the resolu-
tion of the nature of the sentencing hearing: Is this proceeding a
continuation of the criminal proceeding or is it a civil proceeding
akin to that instituted by the filing of a petition for habeas corpus? 42
One would assume that the sentencing hearing is a continuation of
the criminal proceeding except that the Commission adopted a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, which suggests that the Com-
mission views it as somehow analogous to civil, post-conviction
relief proceedings.
If the proceeding is civil in nature, do the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply? Conversely, if the
proceeding is a continuation of the criminal matter, is discovery
confined to the limits of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure? In either eventuality, how much time is to be allowed
for discovery and for general preparations for the sentencing
hearing?
The Commentary indicates that "[t]he parties will have the
right to present and to cross-examine witnesses."'43 Does this mean
that, prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties will
have the right to depose each other's witnesses, to ascertain what
establishes a system with a distinct "prosecution" bias. If federal sentencing is to pro-
ceed according to a categorical paradigm, as opposed to a discretionary one, then the
categories of that system must be completely value neutral if they are to serve the ends
ofjustice and the goals identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
42 Habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not a further step in the criminal case.
See, e.g., Exparte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883); Advisory Committee Note, Or-
ders of the Supreme Court of the United States Adopting and Amending Rules Gov-
erning Proceedings in the United States District Courts 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
43 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,088. The Williams Court offered the following comments on the
use of witnesses at sentencing:
We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide
them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information
were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross examina-
tion.... The type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not
impossible open court testimony with cross examination. Such a procedure could
endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues.
337 U.S. at 250.
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they are likely to say? If so, what use can be made of such deposi-
tions? Can these depositions, for example, be introduced at a sub-
sequent criminal proceeding in order to impeach and/or convict a
witness who offered testimony at the sentencing hearing? Can they
be used as discovery devices by prosecutors who are interested in
initiating new investigations into issues tangential to those raised at
the sentencing hearing? Can these depositions be admitted into evi-
dence at grand jury proceedings? Finally, can "live" testimony of-
fered at the sentencing hearing be put to any of these uses?44
Do the provisions of the Jencks Act apply to sentencing hear-
ings, requiring the government to produce "any statement... of the
witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the
subject matter as to which the witness has testified"? 45 If so, is the
defendant subject to a "reverseJencks" obligation to produce state-
ments in his possession?
It would be possible to continue on in this vein, but the purpose
of this discussion is not to offer every specific objection that might
be made to the Preliminary Draft. Rather, the purpose is to point
out that the conceptual rationale of the proposed guidelines is
flawed insofar as it attempts to retain certain aspects of the old sen-
tencing paradigm while forcing them into the confines of a new and
radically different paradigm.
3. "Modified Real Offense Sentencing"
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 drastically revised the ra-
tionale and procedures of sentencing in the federal system. As the
Williams Court noted, judicial discretion is a venerable feature of
Anglo-American justice, and its influence and effect is implicit in all
of our sentencing practices and assumptions. It is not possible to
engraft a new sentencing system onto these practices and assump-
tions without ascertaining whether, and to what extent, they are
44 These questions are intended to illustrate the fact that the sentencing hearing
could very easily become an instrument of abuse, a device which the government could
use as a "fishing expedition" into the existence and particulars of suspected but as yet
unconfirmed offenses. Under the guidelines as written, the government could offer evi-
dence that could not be admitted at trial because it was insufficient to establish the com-
mission of any criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidence could be
used by the government (a) to obtain sentence aggravation if the defendant was unable
to refute it, and/or (b) to develop leads that might be used in other investigations. The
latter possibility, of course, would exist if and when the defendant chose to present evi-
dence controverting the government's "case" against him. It is easily foreseeable that
the government might be persuaded to put on a remarkably tenuous "case" in order to
force the defendant to put on evidence that might save himself while jeopardizing the
future of others.
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982).
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constitutionally permissible under a system that discards judicial
discretion and replaces it with a structured, almost categorical sen-
tencing procedure.
The allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion is
the perfect example of this proposition. Under a discretionary sys-
tem, the focus of the inquiry is the individual and the measures that
are necessary to ensure that he is adequately sanctioned for his
criminal conduct and is "re-formed" into a productive member of
society. Because the focus of inquiry is the individual, and prophy-
lactic intervention in the course of his life, the sentencing officer is
provided with the widest possible information about the individual's
life. The assumption underlying this approach is that the officer will
exercise his discretion in a reasonable, responsible manner that is
calculated to achieve these ends.46 This assumption was responsible
for the Supreme Court's decision in Williams,47 and this same as-
sumption underlies all the existing sentencing practices and
policies.
Under the new paradigm, however, the focus of inquiry shifts.
The Preliminary Draft is predicated on "modified real offense sen-
tencing," thus the focus of inquiry becomes "all the harms that the
offender actually caused during the course of the conduct for which
he was charged." 48 Although this concept is never specifically de-
46 See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). The present system enforces
this assumption, of course, through the present provisions of Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (effective until Nov. 1, 1987).
47 The Preliminary Draft predicates its allocation of the burdens of production and
persuasion on the holding in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986). See 51
Fed. Reg. at 35,085. This predication is misplaced, however, because it is based upon an
impermissible generalization of a situation specific holding. The issue in McMillan was
the permissibility of employing the preponderance of the evidence standard in finding
the existence of a particular aggravating factor. See 106 S. Ct. at 2416-17. As is dis-
cussed in more detail in Section II(C), infra, the Court upheld the use of the standard in
the narrow context presented in McMillan without doing violence to the principles that
were responsible for the Court's holding in Williams.
48 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,086. The differences between the two systems are dramatically
highlighted by the material contained at Part E of Chapter Three of the Preliminary
Draft. Chapter Three is devoted to "offender characteristics," and includes issues such
as "role in the offense" (Part A), "post offense conduct" (Part B), "criminal history"
(Part C), and "plea agreements" (Part D). Part E is "other offender characteristics." See




4. mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the
defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly
relevant;
5. physical condition, including drug dependence;
6. previous employment record;
7. family ties and responsibilities;
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fined, the Draft notes that it includes "only those real elements (not
8. community ties;
9. role in the offense;
10. criminal history; and
11. degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
Id. at 35,120. As noted above, the last three characteristics are addressed in preceding
sections of Chapter Three. Characteristics I through 8, however, are not addressed in
the Preliminary Draft. See id.
The Commentary notes that the Commission has not decided how the unaddressed
characteristics should be factored into the sentencing process. Id. Several suggestions
have been made, one of which is "allow[ing] the court the discretion to consider one or
more [of] them, as appropriate, in setting the sentence within the 25 percent range."
Id.; see supra note 16. The fact that these factors, which are a primary concern in sentenc-
ing under the present, "rehabilitative" system, have been allowed to languish unconsid-
ered and unaddressed vividly illustrates the dramatic difference between the old and
new sentencing systems.
The Preliminary Draft departs from the Minnesota guidelines as follows: The Min-
nesota guidelines are predicated upon the "offense severity level [which] is determined by
the offense of conviction." Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 16 MINN.
STAT. ANN. app. II.A (West Supp. 1987)(emphasis added). The Minnesota draftsmen
chose this predicate because they "thought that serious legal and ethical questions
would be raised if punishment were to be determined on the basis of alleged, but un-
proven behavior, and prosecutors and defenders would be less accountable in plea ne-
gotiation." Id., § II.A.01, at 300 (comment).
In the Minnesota system, felonies "are arrayed into ten levels of severity, ranging
from low (Severity Level I) to high (Severity Level X)." Id., § II.A, at 300. The most
frequently occurring offenses within each severity level are listed on the vertical axis of
the Sentencing Grid. Id. The severity level for infrequently occurring offenses is deter-
mined by consulting a special table of offenses. Id. "The offense of conviction deter-
mines the appropriate severity level." Id., § II.C, at 311.
The severity level and the offender's criminal history are used to calculate the pre-
sumptive sentence, which is to be imposed absent compelling considerations to the con-
trary. Id., §§ II.C-D, at 311-14. The guidelines list "[f]actors that should not be used as
reasons for" departing from the presumptive sentence. Id., § II.D.1, at 314. These fac-
tors include race, sex, employment history and impact of sentencing on profession or
occupation, educational attainment, marital status and "living arrangements." Id.
Factors that can be used to permit a departure from the presumptive sentence in-
clude both aggravating and mitigating factors. Id., § II.D.2, at 315. Aggravating factors
include the victim's peculiar infirmities, the offender's unusual cruelty, "major con-
trolled substance offense[s]," conviction for inflicting injury in the course of committing
a felony when the offender has prior convictions for similar conduct, and committing "a
major economic offense." Id., § II.D.2.b, at 316-17.
Mitigating factors include the victim's aggressive role in the incident that led to
injury, the offender's minor role in the offense, the offender's commission of the offense
due to physical and/or mental impairment not attributable to drugs or alcohol, the of-
fender's having committed the offense due to coercion or duress, and "[o]ther substan-
tial grounds ... which tend to excuse or mitigate the offender's culpability although not
amounting to a defense." Id., § II.D.2.a, at 315-16. The factors cited, however, are
merely "illustrative." Neither the aggravating nor the mitigating factors are "intended
to be an exclusive or exhaustive list of factors" for departing from presumptive
sentences. Id., § II.D.2.01, at 318 (comment).
The guidelines prescribe the considerations that are to be utilized in determining
whether sentences are consecutive or concurrent. The guidelines also provide that
whenever a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed for a particular offense, the pre-
sumptive sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence or "the duration.., provided in
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necessarily found as elements of the crime charged) that are impor-
tantly bound up with the conduct that constitutes the crime
charged." 49
One wonders what "real elements" of a criminal offense are if
they are not "elements of the crime charged." The unfortunate sus-
picion is that they are, or are likely to become, conduct and circum-
stances for which the government was unable or unwilling to return
an indictment. That is, this open ended definition of "real ele-
ments" would permit the government to introduce evidence that
was too tenuous to support either the return of an indictment or a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but which could withstand
the attenuated procedural requirements of the sentencing hearing.
Under the existing system, the court could disregard such tenu-
ous evidence and enter the sentence that it deemed appropriate.
Under the new system, as outlined in the Preliminary Draft, the
court would apparently not be able to disregard evidence presented
by the government unless the defendant was able to controvert it by
introducing sufficient evidence to satisfy the preponderance of the
evidence standard.50 This change is a defacto reallocation of what
had been a value neutral burden of proof. The parties, under the
present system, are both free to introduce evidence in aggravation
or mitigation, the focus of inquiry being the offender's peculiar
characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation. Under the new
system, the government is free to introduce any evidence that is
conceivably relevant to "the real conduct in which the offender en-
gaged." 51 This means that the defendant is very likely to find him-
self in the position of having to prove that he is innocent of conduct
for which he has not been charged. The government is therefore
given the opportunity to ignore the requirement that conduct be
proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" before sanctions can be
imposed.
This unfortunate state of affairs is the direct result of predicat-
ing sentencing on "modified real offense sentencing." Since the
aim of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and of the guidelines to
the appropriate cell of the Sentencing Guidelines Grid, whichever is longer." Id., § II.E,
at 318. The Minnesota guidelines provide that "[t]he presumptive sentence length for
those convicted of attempted offenses or conspiracies to commit an offense is one half
the duration provided... for the completed offense." Id., § II.G.01 (comment).
49 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,087.
50 As noted above, it is unclear whether the court could disregard the evidence if it
found that it was insufficient to establish the government's prima facie case, however
that concept is defined.
51 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,086. This is as opposed to "only the conduct for which the
offender was convicted." Id.
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be promulgated thereunder is to standardize sentencing and to en-
sure that it proceeds, as nearly as possible, "categorically," the logi-
cal solution is to predicate the system on a "charge of conviction
offense system." Such a system "considers only those elements of
behavior that formed part of the charge of which the offender was
convicted."5 2
If the goal is ensuring that sentences are standardized across
offense categories, then predicating the sentence on a charge of
conviction offense system would achieve this goal without entan-
gling the sentencing court in a lengthy, complex and possibly unfair
inquiry into the "real" circumstances of the affair. 53 Predicating
sentencing on a charge of conviction offense system would mean
that a sentence could be imposed based on the evidence introduced
at trial; this, in turn, would protect the defendant by ensuring that
sentencing decisions are based on facts that were established be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
This alternative also proceeds on the constitutionally irre-
52 Id.
53 Indeed, the net effect of the Draft's reliance upon "modified real offense sentenc-
ing" is to exacerbate the unfortunate effects attendant upon what Congress referred to
as "the judge factor." See Section II(A), supra. That is, the proposed system is a semi-
categorical sentencing system that relies upon offense characteristics which are extrane-
ous to the charged offense in calculating its "sanction units." See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. at
35,085 & 35,120. In relying upon factors that are extraneous to the charged offense, the
proposed guidelines deprive the convicted offender of the right to be punished only for
conduct that has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and thereby heightening the
potential for sentences that reflect judicial prejudices and/or vindictiveness.
If the substitution of a charge of conviction offense system is found unacceptable,
then the final guidelines should incorporate a rule of the type discussed in the Commen-
tary to the guidelines for the application of modified real offense sentencing. See id. at
35,088. The rule in question would allow a sentencing officer to consider "all real of-
fense elements unless any such element constitutes a separate crime, in which case the
government must charge that offense separately." Id.
The proposed guidelines reject both this rule and a rule allowing "the sentencing
judge to consider all conduct or harms (threatened or accomplished) committed in fur-
therance of the crime of conviction." Id. Instead, the proposed guidelines substitute a
system of cross-references, the rationale for which is that they "identify additional con-
duct that is often associated with the statutory elements charged in [an] indictment." Id.
The only reason given for rejecting the rule that would bar consideration of ele-
ments that constitute separate crimes is that "the Commission does not believe that this
particular rule would work in the federal system, where the existence of separate crimes
often depends upon the happenstance of factors creating federal jurisdiction." Id.
Although this statement is never clarified, the logical conclusion seems to be that the
rule was rejected out of a concern that the fortuitousness of federal jurisdiction would
render it underinclusive and, therefore, limit its effectiveness.
The better alternative would be to incorporate the rule in question, and then to
supplement it with specific cross references whenever they may be necessary to avoid the
consideration of conduct which logically constitutes a separate criminal offense but
which is not so defined under applicable federal statutes.
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proachable assumption that the legislature's definition of an offense
and specification of penalties includes a consideration of all of the
"harms" associated therewith. If the ambition is creating a system
that achieves the maximum impact on offense commission by impos-
ing essentially identical sanctions for each instance of an offense,
then the logical way to achieve this goal is through a charge of con-
viction offense system that relies on standardized offense categories
and standardized penalties.
The onus would then be (properly) on the legislature to draft
offense statutes (a) that are directed toward the harms associated
with each offense, and (b) that identify the penalties that could be
imposed for the commission of each such offense. The Sentencing
Commission could then monitor the success of each penalty, and
establish guidelines to be used in determining when imprisonment
or lesser sanctions are appropriate. The Commission could also
develop guidelines to be used in determining when certain offender
characteristics could warrant the imposition of a sentence other than
incarceration. If sentencing were predicated on a charge of convic-
tion offense system, then it would be both logical and constitution-
ally permissible to require the defendant to bear the burden of
establishing the existence and operation of offender characteristics
warranting such a non-prison sentence.54
Unless the system proceeded according to absolutely standard-
ized offense and sanction categories, it would be impossible to elim-
inate any vestiges of judicial discretion. Since it does not appear
that Congress intended to rely on absolutely standardized offense
and sanction categories, a charge of conviction offense system
would require the good offices of the Sentencing Commission to en-
sure that there was an equitable correlation between generalized
sanction categories and specific offenses.
The requirement that the Sentencing Commission oversee the
categories might very well necessitate the establishment of guide-
lines analogous to those contained in the Preliminary Draft. The
54 The reference is, of course, to establishing the existence and operation of the as-
yet-undefined "other characteristics." See id. at 35,120. The suggestion is that the of-
fender be allowed to establish the existence of such characteristics in order to establish
that a sentence of a non-incarcerative sanction should be imposed. Requiring the of-
fender to bear such a burden is constitutionally permissible and pragmatically appeal-
ing, because the offender has primary access to the information required for such a
demonstration and because aggravating factors are a constitutionally cognized burden
for defendants. The incorporation of this factor would require, of course, that the Com-
mission undertake to define the proof required for each mitigating factor and the rela-
tionship which these factors would have, jointly and/or severally, to the non-
incarcerative sentences discussed. See id. at 35,122-23.
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difference would be, however, that the guidelines would be formu-
lated for, and apply to, conduct that had already been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. This defense alone would alleviate the
procedural problems discussed above, and would obviate the neces-
sity for transforming the sentencing hearing into a second, "mini-
trial."
C. OTHER PROBLEMS
It is simply not possible, given the constraints on the authors'
time and the reader's attention span, to analyze every conceivable
issue inherent in the guidelines in the Preliminary Draft. The previ-
ous section addressed what is perhaps the most compelling issue,
namely, the difficulties inherent in "modified real offense sentenc-
ing" as expressed in the Preliminary Draft. This section points out
several other issues which the authors feel are of sufficient impor-
tance to warrant reconsideration by the Commission.
1. Presumptive Aggravation
One problem, the magnitude of which is second only to that of
"modified real offense sentencing," is that the guidelines, as
drafted, are skewed so that they at least implicitly establish pre-
sumptive aggravation. In so doing, the guidelines offend the dic-
tates of due process as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Patterson
v. New York, 55 Mullaney v. Wilbur,56 and In re Winship. 57
In Mullaney, the Supreme Court was confronted with a Maine
statute that "require[d] a defendant charged with murder to prove
that he acted 'in the heat of passion on sudden provocation' in order
to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. ' 5 8 Under Maine law, mur-
der carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, while man-
slaughter was punishable by a fine or imprisonment not to exceed
twenty years. 59  Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. was convicted of murder
under this statute and appealed, arguing that "he had been denied
due process because he was required to negate the element of mal-
ice aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation. ' 60 Wilbur argued that malice aforethought
was an essential element of the crime of murder and thus, the bur-
den was on the prosecution to establish the existence of this ele-
55 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
56 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
58 421 U.S. at 684-85.
59 Id. at 686 n.3.
60 Id. at 687.
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ment by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.61
Maine's representatives argued to the Supreme Court that Win-
ship did not apply to Wilbur's circumstance, since "the absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a 'fact necessary to
constitute the crime' of felonious homicide in Maine." 62 They ar-
gued that the statutory presumption was outside the compass of
Winship because it came into play only after the jury had determined
guilt, 63 and its only effect was on the quantum of punishment
inflicted.64
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that "[t]he
safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply be-
cause a determination may already have been reached that would
stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a significant impair-
ment of personal liberty." 65
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as de-
fined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in
its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that con-
stitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely
on the extent of punishment .... If Winship were limited to a State's
definition of the elements of a crime, . . . States could define all as-
saults as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove
the elements of aggravation .... 66
The Court also held that Winship's protections extend to the alloca-
tion of the burdens of production and persuasion:
In Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained with the prose-
cution, although the standard had been reduced to proof by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In this case, by contrast, the State has
affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result,
in a case such as this one where the defendant is required to prove the
critical fact in dispute, is to increase further the likelihood of an erro-
61 Id. Wilbur relied on the Court's decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
which held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged." Id. at 364. The Maine Supreme Court rejected Wilbur's
argument, holding that the state could rely upon a presumption of malice aforethought
and require the defendant to rebut the presumption by establishing that he had acted in
the heat of passion. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688 (discussing State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139
(Me. 1971)).
62 Id. at 697 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)(emphasis in original)).
63 Id.
64 [P]etitioners seek to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the extent of
punishment it should be considered a matter within the traditional discretion of the
sentencing body and therefore not subject to rigorous due process demands.
Id. at 697 n.23.
65 Id. at 698.
66 Id. at 698 n.24.
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neous ... conviction. Such a result directly contravenes the principle
articulated in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958):
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a
criminal defendant his liberty-th[e] margin of error is reduced as to
him by the process of placing on the [prosecution] the burden... of
persuading the fact finder at the conclusion of the trial .... 67
Many of the guidelines contained in the Preliminary Draft are
inconsistent with the holding in Mullaney because they presume the
existence of aggravating factors unless the defendant comes forward
with evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 68 This directly contravenes Mullaney's holding
that the prosecution must bear the initial burden of production and
the ultimate burden of persuasion on factors that effect the severity
of the punishment that is inflicted. 69
67 Id. at 700-01.
68 This is a matter that is discussed in more detail infra, in the critique of the tax
offense guidelines. It is also important to note that the guidelines in the Preliminary
Draft suffer from what might be termed "systemic presumptive aggravation." That is,
aggravating factors and their effects have been specified in great detail. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in Chapter Three, which is devoted to "offender characteristics."
See supra Section II(B)(3).
As noted above, the Commission has taken great pains to specify offense values for
such aggravating offender characteristics as "role in the offense," "post-offense con-
duct" and "criminal history." See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,114-18. True, the section on "post-
offense conduct" does include a consideration of mitigating factors; it is noteworthy,
however, that the factors that have been included--e.g., cooperation with federal au-
thorities, surrender and restitution-are factors that are of primary importance to the
prosecution. See id. at 35,115-16.
Traditional mitigating factors such as age, education, mental, emotional and physi-
cal condition, community and family ties and other similar considerations have been left
unaddressed. If the guidelines are to be truly value-neutral, then these and other miti-
gating considerations must be factored into the sentencing calculus in order to ensure
that some equitable balance is struck between mitigation and aggravation. If the Com-
mission decides to retain the mathematical structure of the Preliminary Draft, mitigating
factors should be given negative scores so that the total mitigating factor score can be
summed and subtracted from the offense value. The Commission should also define
multipliers to be used in circumstances in which certain mitigating factors will have a
cumulative and/or additive effect the true influence of which would not be felt absent
recourse to such a factor.
69 See, e.g., 421 U.S. at 697-98. In this respect McMillan is distinguishable from Mulla-
ney and from the sentencing paradigm contained in the Preliminary Draft. McMillan up-
held a Pennsylvania statute that made convicted felons "subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing judge finds, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the person 'visibly possessed a firearm' during the
commission of the offense." 106 S. Ct. at 2414. The issue in McMillan was the permissi-
bility of employing the preponderance standard in this determination; McMillan unsuc-
cessfully argued that the standard for the determination should be either the beyond a
reasonable doubt or the clear and convincing evidence standard. See id. at 2415-20.
The Supreme Court held that the preponderance standard was constitutionally ac-
ceptable and upheld the statute because "consistent with Winship, Mullaney, and Patter-
son, [it] 'creates no presumption as to any essentialfact and places no burden on the defendant.' " Id.
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2. Other Issues
One author has already observed that, under the new Act and
the sentencing guidelines, "a substantially enlarged sentencing pro-
cess in the district courts, more wide ranging and adversarial, can be
anticipated. ' 70 This same author also observed that it is readily
foreseeable that "it will be an important part of the effective assist-
ance of counsel for defense lawyers to litigate the application of the
guidelines. '71
This points out another important issue, namely, the effect the
Preliminary Draft system will have on an already overburdened
court system. As noted above, the transformation of the sentencing
hearing into a "mini trial" will have serious consequences. First, it
will be necessary to determine what evidentiary and procedural
rules apply to the proceeding. Once that determination is made, it
will be necessary to address the pragmatic issues that the determina-
tion raises.
Assume, for example, that it is determined that discovery is per-
missible in this sentencing proceeding and that it is governed by the
at 2415 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 23, 35, 494 A.2d 354, 359
(1985) (emphasis added)).
All McMillan means, therefore, is that the preponderance of the evidence standard
is an appropriate standard to be employed in determining the presence or absence of
aggravating and/or mitigating factors. It does not mean that the burden of establishing
any such factor can be alleviated by establishing a presumption in favor of the propo-
nent thereof.
70 Rezneck, supra note 10, at 790.
71 Rezneck, supra note 10, at 791. With respect to this issue, it is of interest to note
the litigation that has apparently been generated by the implementation of the Minne-
sota sentencing guidelines. The Minnesota guidelines have been in effect since 1980.
See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 16 MINN. STAT. ANN. app. (West
Supp. 1987)(most recent version).
In the interests of curiosity and a modest empiricism, the authors undertook a
LEXIS search to determine whether these guidelines have generated a significant
amount of litigation. As of December 23, 1986, a LEXIS search consisting of "sentenc!
w/8 guidelinel" produced a listing of 601 cases in which the existence and/or applica-
tion of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines was at issue. With all due respect to Minne-
sota, it is a state with a relatively small population; if sentencing guidelines can produce
601 cases in Minnesota in six years, one wonders what similar guidelines will do to the
federal system.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it would be interesting to undertake
an analysis of the Minnesota sentencing litigation in order to determine (a) whether it
has increased over the years, decreased over the years or become relatively stable, and
(b) the percentage of the litigation that is concerned with challenging the application of
the guidelines, as opposed to associated issues. From a quick scan of selected cases, this
appears to be a primary issue in the litigation. See, e.g., State v. Litzinger, 394 N.W.2d
803 (Minn. 1986); State v. Solomon, 359 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1984); State v. Gist, 358
N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1984); State v. Mallory, 329 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1983).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or some analogue thereof.72 This
determination alone will present the court system with an incredible
number of decisions that must be made as to the scope of discovery,
the amount of time allowed for discovery and similar issues. These
problems will, in effect, double the amount of time required for the
final resolution of a criminal proceeding. 73
Yet another issue is the problem of the defendant's need to pre-
serve his right to appeal while not exposing himself to the possibility
of an unnecessarily harsh sentence. Assume, for the moment, that a
criminal defendant (a) has been convicted after a trial in which he
chose not to put in a defense based on his determination that the
government's proof was insufficient to establish a prima facie case,
or (b) has entered a conditional plea under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 (a) (2), which allows a defendant to enter a plea while
reserving the right to appeal on a specified issue. 74
The time comes for sentencing. What is the defendant to do
when the government introduces evidence in aggravation at the sen-
tencing hearing? If he stands mute, and declines to introduce evi-
dence on his own behalf, he runs the risk of receiving an enhanced
sentence. If, however, he decides to introduce evidence on his own
behalf, can that evidence later be used against him, as the basis for
denying his appeal? If he decides to waive his fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and testify on his own behalf, can
that testimony be used to supplement the trial record and provide
the basis for ruling against him on his challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence introduced against him?75
72 As Rezneck notes, "H.R. 6012, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), which attempted to
spell out some of the procedures for the sentencing hearing, was not enacted."
Rezneck, supra note 10, at 791 n.39.
73 The sentencing hearing will also have a negative effect on the conservation ofjudi-
cial resources that is currently effected by guilty pleas. Under the present system, of
course, pleas ensure that matters are concluded with minimal impact on the court's re-
sources and calendar. Under the proposed system, however, the guilty plea will no
longer have this necessary effect; under the new system, as noted above, even guilty
pleas are likely to require the convening of lengthy sentencing hearings which will ne-
cessitate the expenditure of additional judicial resources. This, too, will have a cumula-
tive negative effect upon the already overburdened federal court system.
74 With the approval of the court and the consent of the government, a defendant
may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the
right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any
specified pretrial motion. If the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to
withdraw his plea.
FED. R. GRIM. P. ll(a)(2).
75 The above-described situation is perfectly analogous to that which exists when a
criminal defendant has made a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the gov-
ernment's evidence, the motion has been denied, and he proceeds to put on a defense:
[A] criminal defendant who, after denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal at the
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The Preliminary Draft does not address the operation and effect
of plea bargains. 76 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ex-
pressly permit the parties to plea bargain a sentence. 77 The Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 did not change this aspect of the
Federal Rules. 78 The Act has raised a number of questions regard-
ing plea bargaining under the new provisions.
Can the parties, for instance, enter into a plea bargain that calls
for a sentence that is outside the applicable guidelines? If they do
enter into such a bargain, is the court bound to honor it, or can the
court disregard "unconventional" bargains at its discretion? If the
court disregards such a bargain, can the defendant then petition the
appellate court for reinstatement of the bargain? 79  If the parties
can "bargain away" applicable guidelines, then what effect will this
have on the sentencing system?80 If the parties cannot "bargain
away" applicable guidelines, then what is the incentive for engaging
in plea bargaining?
The question of whether or not the parties can plea bargain for
close of the government's case in chief, proceeds with the presentation of his own
case, waives his objection to the denial. The motion can.., be renewed... but
appellate review of denial of the later motion would take into account all evidence
introduced to that point.
United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(en banc). Under the so-
called "waiver rule," a defendant who proceeds with the presentation of his evidence
thereby risks putting in evidence that will "fill[] in the gaps in the government's case."
8AJ. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 29.05 (2d ed. 1986). The authors' concern
is that an analogue of the waiver rule will emerge in the context that is discussed in the
text, above.
76 See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,130.
77 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(B)-(C).
78 See, e.g., Rezneck, supra note 10, at 794 n.61.
79 The availability of appellate relief for violations of plea bargains is established by
18 U.S.C. § 3742, which was added by the Sentencing Reform Act and which establishes
the mechanisms for appellate review of sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. III
1985)(effective Nov. 1, 1987)(added by Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 213(a), 98 Stat. 2011
(1984) and amended by Pub. L. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4), a defendant can seek review of a sentence that "was
imposed for an offense for which a sentencing guideline has been issued by the Sentenc-
ing Commission... and the sentence is greater than.., the sentence specified in a plea
agreement . .. under Rule 1 l(e)(1)(B) or (e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." The equivalent right is granted to the government in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(b)(4), which allows it to seek review of a sentence that is less than a sentence
specified in a plea agreement under either subsection of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11. The unanswered question is, however, whether the above cited provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3742 apply to plea bargains the terms of which are outside the applicable
guidelines.
80 "[I]n Minnesota where a sentencing guideline [system] is already in effect, the plea
bargaining process has superseded the guidelines and has reintroduced the disparities
which the system [was] intended to eliminate." Rezneck, supra note 10, at 795 (citing the
remarks of Professor B. James George at a conference on the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, as reported in 36 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2343 (Feb., 1985)).
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a sentence outside the guidelines raises yet another issue. Under
the present system, a defendant can plead guilty to certain conduct
contained, let us say, in Count I of a two count indictment, and
thereby assure himself that the penalty imposed will reflect only a
portion of the unlawful conduct attributed to him. The net effect is
to lessen the defendant's exposure to penal sanctions; since this ef-
fect has advantageous consequences for the defendant, it represents
a direct inducement to engage in plea bargaining.
Will the same result occur under the new system? Under the
proposed guidelines, a defendant could plead guilty to Count I of
the same two count indictment, and then find that the conduct al-
leged in Count II was being introduced into evidence against him at
the sentencing hearing, under the guise that it constituted part of
the "actual harm," or "real conduct" involved in the commission of
Count I. Although the sentence that would result from this scenario
should be less than would have been imposed had the defendant
been convicted of both counts, the fact remains that the advanta-
geous consequences of the plea bargain have been markedly
reduced.
Defendants under the new system may thus find it more to their
advantage to proceed to trial and require the government to prove
the allegations contained in both counts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although this alternative is fraught with its own risks, it holds out
more hopeful possibilities than pleading to one count with the cer-
tainty that the conduct in the remaining counts will ominously ap-
pear, like Banquo's ghost, at the sentencing hearing.
Although there are other observations that can be made, one
final point is that the system established by the guidelines markedly
increases the bargaining power of the prosecutor. His ability to
draft indictments ensures that he will be able to manipulate the
guidelines to his advantage, by crafting indictments that will permit
the maximum possible exploitation of charged and uncharged con-
duct.81 If the Commission intends, insofar as possible, to establish a
system that is value neutral in regard to the comparative bargaining
power of the parties, the Commission should reconsider the guide-
lines in light of their potential for producing "inflated" sentences
resulting from the clever manipulation of charging considerations.8 2
81 See, e.g., Rezneck, supra note 10, at 795-96.
82 The potential for such abuse could, of course, be dramatically reduced if the final
guidelines were to include a rule of the type that is discussed supra at note 53.
Similar criticisms of the Preliminary Draft were advanced by the Honorable Michael
M. Mihm, a federal judge sitting in the Central District of Illinois, in the comments
which he offered to the Commission, and by John J. Jones, Chair, Section of Taxation,
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III. "OFFENSES INVOLVING TAXATION"
The comments presented earlier in Section II apply with equal
force to the guidelines that have been proposed for "offenses in-
American Bar Association. In addition to the criticism leveled by invited commentators,
the Preliminary Draft has also received critical reviews in the National Law Journal and
in the ABA Journal.
In an article entitled "Is Sentencing Panel on the Rocks?", the National LawJournal
offered the following observations on the Preliminary Draft:
Sentencing commission members once optimistically thought they could revo-
lutionize the federal criminal justice system. Now, however, in light of the harsh
reaction to their proposals, many lawyers closely associated with the commission
fear the panel may have tried too much, too soon, and failed.
At hearings around the country, during the last month, the response from
judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors and probation officers has ranged from con-
cern over the scheme's enormous complexity to worry that punishment by formula
inevitably will lead to unjust results, despite attempts to fine- tune sentences.
Nat. L.J. Dec. 8, 1986, at 3, col. 1. The article goes on to describe the criticism that has
come from various quarters of the legal community, and quotes the Honorable Mark L.
Wolf, a federal district judge sitting in Boston, as predicting that when the guidelines
become effective "all hell is going to break loose in the court system." Id. at 12, col. I.
In this same vein, the article notes that "[a] second group of critics, including many
judges, is particularly distraught over the impact the guidelines could have on court
caseloads. The way the guidelines have been drawn, they say, will cause a tidal wave of
protracted sentencing hearings, wreaking havoc on the federal courts." Id. The piece
also includes the observation that "many suggest [that] the incentive to plead guilty will
dissolve under the guidelines, sharply increasing the number ofjury trials." Id.
Similar comments appear in the ABA article, "Fixed Sentencing Proposed," which
appeared in theJanuary 1, 1987 edition of thejournal. See 73 A.B.A.J. 27 (Jan. 1, 1987).
The ABA article begins by describing the structure of sentencing under the guidelines,
and then goes on to describe certain of the criticism which the Preliminary Draft has
elicited:
Fred Bartlit, Jr., a criminal defense attorney with Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago,
said the proposal would result in more complex and longer sentencing hearings
because defense lawyers would argue about the factors that increase or decrease the
penalty.
"It would be a bonanza for lawyers like me," Bartlit said. "We will write briefs,
we will bring in expert witnesses, we will bring in economists."
Id. The article quotes Terence MacCarthy, director of the Federal Defender Program in
Chicago, as stating that the sentencing proposal "would... result in more trials and
appeals." Id. "More defendants will request trials just to produce evidence that will
mitigate the sentence, MacCarthy said. And, more appeals will be sought on whether
the judge used the correct sentencing procedure." Id. The article also quotes the criti-
cisms offered by Judge Mihm, who said, among other things, "'that it's too complicated
to work, that error is almost inevitable, that it's too formalistic.'" Id.
The ABA article concludes by describing the position which the ABA has taken with
regard to the Preliminary Draft.
In a draft statement at the December hearing [on the Draft], the ABA criticized
the guidelines as too rigid and too severe.
The ABA said that sentencing should not be "reduced to a mechanistic ritual."
"The Association recommends that the Commission rethink the level of detail
set forth in the guidelines and hence, the degree to which the sentencing judge's
discretion is limited considering the substitution of more general standards, set
forth in words rather that [sic] in numbers," the draft testimony said.
Id. at 28.
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volving taxation," and the reader should consider that they have
been incorporated into this section by reference. The purpose of
this section is not to reiterate issues that have already been consid-
ered but, instead, to comment on issues that are peculiar to tax of-
fenses and the guidelines that have been proposed for these
offenses.
With that purpose in mind, this section has been divided into
two sub-sections, the first of which discusses specific problem areas
in order to illustrate how the issues previously considered in Section
II, affect particular guidelines. The second sub-section demon-
strates that the tax guidelines are flawed because they have been
generated by a sentencing paradigm that is constructed around a
central, undefined term.
A. SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS
Guideline section C211 is concerned with the offense of tax
evasion, 83 and provides as follows:
The base offense value is determined by the table below.84 Applica-
tion of the table is to be based on the tax deficiency, i.e., the total
amount of tax that the taxpayer evaded or attempted to evade. The
deficiency does not include any interest or penalties. If multiple
counts are involved, e.g., when the taxpayer evaded taxes in several
years, the deficiencies should be added. If the offense involved an at-
tempt to evade taxes that, as of the time of the offense had not yet
become due, compute the deficiency using a tax rate of 30%.85
The general guideline is supplemented with the following "specific
offense characteristics":
If all or part of the taxpayer's income was obtained unlawfully, applica-
tion of the table is to be based on the deficiency plus the amount of
any unreported unlawfully obtained income. Unreported income is pre-
sumed to have been obtained unlawfully, unless otherwise established by the of-
fender. Example: Suppose that the offender's tax deficiency is $25,000
and the amount of unreported income is $60,000. Unless it is estab-
lished that the unreported income was obtained unlawfully, the defi-
ciency.., would be $85,000 and the offense value would be 26 rather
83 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) makes it a criminal offense to "willfully attempt[] in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof...."
84 The table, which is omitted here, lists thirteen deficiency categories, each of which
is accompanied by a corresponding "base offense value." 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,095. The
first category is for deficiencies of "up to $1,000" and carries a base offense value of 10;
the second category is for deficiencies of from $1,001 to $5,000, and carries a base of-
fense value of 12. The next to the last category consists of deficiencies of from
$1,000,001 to $2,000,000 and carries a base offense value of 54, while the final category
is for deficiencies of over $2,000,000 and carries a base offense value of 60. See id.
85 Id.
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than 18.86
The first issue to be addressed is the issue that is raised by the
italicized portion of the above quotation, namely, the fact that
"[u]nreported income is presumed to have been obtained unlaw-
fully, unless otherwise established by the offender."87 This article
has demonstrated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rely on
presumptions which assume the existence of aggravating factors and
require the defendant to bear the burdens of production and per-
suasion to the contrary. Yet, that is precisely what this statement
accomplishes. A defendant who has been convicted of tax evasion
bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish that
his unreported income was not obtained unlawfully; if he fails to
satisfy this burden, he has also failed to discharge his burden of per-
suasion and will be given an enhanced sentence based on the as-
sumption that all of his unreported income was obtained through
unlawful means. 88
Aside from the fact that it is inconsistent with the requirements
of due process as interpreted in Mullaney, Winship and Patterson, the
presumption is also subject to objection on other grounds. First,
the existence of the presumption directly jeopardizes the offender's
right to rely on his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
Assume that the offender did not take the stand during trial,
and assume, further, that the source of his unreported income was
conduct which is, itself, not illegal but the circumstances of which
could expose him to additional criminal charges.89 Our hypotheti-
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 Id.
88 In the example quoted above, the tax deficiency was $25,000 and the amount of
unreported income was $60,000. If the base offense value is calculated on the basis of
the tax deficiency alone, it results in a score of 18. If the offender is unable to rebut the
presumption of unlawfulness, however, the additional $60,000 is added into the equa-
tion and the base offense score rises to 26.
The sinister implications of the presumption are even more evident in another, pos-
sibly more realistic, example. Assume that the tax deficiency is $28,000 and the amount
of unreported income is $100,000. If the base offense value is calculated on the amount
of tax deficiency alone, the score is 18. If the offender is unable to prove that his unre-
ported income was obtained through lawful means, however, then the $100,000 is ad-
ded to the $28,000 tax deficiency, which means that the base offense value rises to 30, a
net increase of 12 offense value points.
89 A vivid, if perhaps slightly bizarre, illustration serves to demonstrate the validity of
the point at issue: Assume that an individual, a male, owns and operates a "mom and
pop" grocery store. Assume, further, that the individual has been indicted and con-
victed of tax evasion, his conviction having resulted from the government's proving un-
reported income through a net worth case. The time comes for sentencing. The
defendant has a secret that he did not reveal at trial, namely, that the increase in net
worth resulted from his having operated the store on two shifts, a daytime shift and a
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cal offender is faced with two equally unattractive choices: (1) exer-
cise his privilege, allow the presumption to stand unrebutted and
receive a sentence that is enhanced in direct proportion to the
amount of income received; or (2) waive the privilege, reveal the
circumstances under which the income was generated and face the
possibility of additional criminal charges.
Requiring the offender to elect between the Scylla of exercising
his privilege and suffering therefor or the Charybdis of waiving the
privilege and suffering for that choice would seem to be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decisions in Garrity v. New Jersey,90 and in
Spevack v. Klein,91 both of which held that no penalty can be attached
to an individual's right to exercise his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 92 The presumption contained in guide-
line section C211 directly imposes a penalty on one's right to stand
silent and is therefore inconsistent with the requirements of the fifth
amendment.
In addition to the fact that the unlawfulness of the income is
"presumed," the proposed specific offense characteristics for guide-
line section C211 are subject to another objection. The guideline is
predicated on the concept of "unlawfully obtained income," but this
concept is never defined.93 When is income "unlawfully obtained"
for the purposes of guideline section C2 11 ?
nighttime shift. Each shift was operated with the assistance of a different wife, a different
mom," as it were.
What should the defendant do at his sentencing hearing? He can rebut the pre-
sumption that his income was unlawfully obtained by revealing his secret. If he does so,
however, he exposes himself to a bigamy charge. His only hope of avoiding an en-
hanced sentence on the tax evasion conviction is to reveal his secret and expose himself
to the possibility of being tried and convicted for bigamy and receiving an additional
sentence for that offense. The net effect of the above quoted presumption is to enact a
penalty for his exercising his fifth amendment right to remain silent, an effect which is
blatantly unconstitutional.
90 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
91 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
92 Garrity involved police officers who, when questioned about the alleged fixing of
traffic tickets, answered the questions after being told that they were entitled to remain
silent but that if they did so, they would be removed from office. See 385 U.S. 494-95. In
Spevack, an attorney who had exercised his privilege and refused to testify at a judicial
inquiry was disbarred because the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
held that the privilege was not available to him under the holding of Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117 (1961). In Garrity, the Court held that the threat of losing one's employ-
ment was sufficient coercion to implicate the protections of the privilege. 385 U.S. at
496-97. In Spevack, the Court overruled Cohen and held that under the fifth amendment
a person has the right to remain silent without suffering any penalty therefor; the Court
found that, because "penalty" refers to the imposition of any sanction which makes as-
sertion of the privilege "costly," disbarment was a penalty sufficient to implicate the
protections of the fifth amendment. 385 U.S. at 514-16.
93 See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,095.
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Is "unlawfully obtained income" only income that is generated
by activities that are prohibited by lawfully enacted criminal stat-
utes? If so, does the concept extend to activities that are unlawful
under state statutes or is it limited to activities that are prohibited by
federal criminal statutes? Or is the concept intended to have a
wider meaning, extending to activities that are "immoral" or
"wrong" or "unethical"? The uncertainty inherent in the guide-
line's use of the concept of "unlawfully obtained income" is best
illustrated by means of yet another example. Assume that an indi-
vidual is the sole stockholder of a corporation, and assume further
that he has been skimming money from the corporation's receipts.
Let us say that he has been diverting all the corporation's even num-
bered sales receipts to his own use, and reporting only the income
generated by the odd numbered sales receipts. Having done so, he
then signs an income tax return that is based on and reflects his
diversion of approximately half of the corporation's actual income.
Our perpetrator is indicted, tried and convicted of tax evasion.
When the time for sentencing comes, is he liable for an enhanced
sentence as one whose "income was obtained unlawfully"? Was the
unreported income "obtained unlawfully" in that it was the product
of theft from his own corporation? Or is "unlawfully" obtained in-
come limited to income that is the direct proceeds of "unlawful"
activity such as drug dealing, numbers running and prostitution?
The difficulty is that the guideline places the burden on the of-
fender to demonstrate that his income was not obtained unlawfully,
and then fails to provide any guidance as to what is necessary to
establish that income is, in fact, "lawful." Aside from the impermis-
sibility of enacting such a presumption, the whole concept of "un-
lawfully obtained income" is so amorphous that it imposes
tremendous conceptual and practical difficulties on an offender who
is required to demonstrate that his income was not obtained
unlawfully. 94
Turning to another, equally important issue, most of the tax
offense guidelines are predicated on, or include a consideration of,
the amount of tax that has not been paid. 95 Until now, the amount
of unpaid tax was not relevant to establishing the offense except in-
94 One commentator has noted yet another concern, namely, "that this factor should
not be used to punish individuals for unproven offenses." Letter from Ian M. Comisky
to the Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the United States Sentencing
Commission (July 11, 1986)[hereinafter cited as Comiskey Letter].
95 As discussed above, the tax evasion guideline, § C211, determines base offense
values according to the "total amount of tax that the taxpayer evaded or attempted to
evade." 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,095; see also supra note 83. Guideline § C212, which applies
to the "willful failure to file [a] return, supply information or pay tax," uses a base of-
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sofar as the amount provided inferential evidence that the omission
of the income was due to factors other than negligence or inadver-
tence. Under the proposed guidelines, however, the amount of in-
come becomes a significant factor in determining the sentence that
will be imposed.
One concern that immediately comes to mind is the question as
to how this amount will be determined at the sentencing hearing.
Will the government be allowed to introduce evidence that was not
presented at trial? Will the issues at the sentencing hearing be con-
fined to issues that were defined at trial, or will the government be
allowed to introduce any "dirty laundry" that it has unearthed that
involves the defendant's tax and/or business affairs? If the Commis-
sion is seriously committed to including the amount of unpaid tax as
a factor in sentencing, then the guidelines must be reformulated so
that they narrow the concept to reflect only the conduct with which
the defendant was charged and convicted. 96
fense value that is "80% of the offense value for Tax Evasion specified in [§ ] C211." Id.
(emphasis deleted).
Guideline § C213, which applies to "fraud and false statement" offenses, includes a
cross reference to the base offense values for tax evasion. See id. ("If the conduct was in
furtherance of an effort to evade payment of a tax ... the offense value is the offense
value for [§ ] C211 .. "). Guideline § C214, which applies to the offense of "aiding,
assisting, procuring, counseling, or advising tax fraud," uses a base offense value of 10,
but includes the following as a specific offense characteristic: "If the conduct occurred
in connection with an effort to evade a specific tax obligation, the base offense value is
that for evasion of tax by the principal from [§ ] C211 (Tax Evasion)." Id. (emphasis
deleted).
Guideline § C216, which applies to the offense of "failing to collect or truthfully
account for and pay over tax," uses the base offense values given in guideline § C211.
See id. (emphasis deleted). And, finally, guideline § C217, which applies to the offense of
"failing to deposit collected taxes in trust account as required after notice," uses a "base
offense value [of] 6, or 25% of the offense value from [§ ] C211 (Tax Evasion), which-
ever is greater." Id. (emphasis deleted). (These references to the guidelines are, of
course, not intended to blur the conceptual distinctions between 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) offenses. In 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the government must prove that
there is a tax due and owing, which required that the government prove the existence of
additional unreported income. 26 U.S.C. section 7206(1), on the other hand, merely
requires that the government establish that the return was false as to a "material mat-
ter," which may or may not be unreported income.)
96 Even if this proposal is incorporated into the proposed guidelines, there is still
another issue that remains to be resolved, namely, whether the computation of tax for
sentencing purposes includes only those items alleged and proven at trial or whether it
includes items such as the disallowed deductions that always appear in the Revenue
Agent's Report. Often, items in the Revenue Agent's Report are considered for a civil
fraud case, but are eliminated from the criminal case, since only the dearest items are
used in a criminal proceeding. Under the guidelines, if an offender is convicted based
upon the government's proof of "clearly fraudulent" items, can the government go back
at sentencing and reopen these issues, introducing items that could not have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt but which can satisfy a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard?
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It may be, however, that the better course is to eliminate this
element entirely, or at least to minimize its importance. In this re-
gard, we agree with a statement which Ian M. Comisky9 7 submitted
to the Commission in a letter dated July 11, 1986.98 In his state-
ment, Mr. Comisky makes the following observation regarding the
proposed tax offense guidelines:
Under the proposal, a person convicted of evading $2,000,000 of taxes
would be classified with someone who evaded $100,001 in tax liability
and a person who evaded $89,999 of tax would be grouped with some-
one attempting to evade $1200 of tax. The tremendous disparity be-
tween these offenders will defeat the purpose for which the Guidelines
were created. In addition, it may not be appropriate to treat a
$100,000 tax evasion when 6 million dollars of taxes were paid with
the return in a similar fashion to a $100,000 tax evasion when only
$20,000 of taxes were paid with the return. 99
Comisky also quotes a statement from Roger Olsen, at that time As-
sistant Attorney General and presently Assistant Attorney General,
in the Tax Division of the Department ofJustice, in which Mr. Olsen
made the following comment about the proposed tax offense
guidelines:
In short, we urge that the Commission should not use the amount
omitted, falsely characterized or deducted, as a primary or controlling
factor in judging the seriousness of tax crimes. Rather,... the amount
in dispute in tax cases is but one of a numbers [sic] of factors.100
The point is, that the guidelines' reliance on the unpaid tax is mis-
placed, because it gives rise to arbitrary and erratic distinctions that
are a poor substitute for the idiosyncrasies of sentencing under the
97 Chairman, Sub-Committee on Constitutional and Attorney Client Privileges,
Committee on Civil and Criminal Tax penalties, American Bar Association Section on
Taxation.
98 The letter was addressed to the Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of
the Sentencing Commission, and expresses the reactions of members of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Civil and Criminal Tax Penalties.
99 Comisky Letter, supra note 94, at 3. Comisky also discusses an alternative approach
to the problem:
[S]ome Commentators have suggested that the Guidelines should group tax evasion
by the percentage of total tax liability which has been understated. For example,
persons understating their tax liability by 100%o would be grouped together even if
one person owed $200,000 and the other only $20,000 in additional taxes. The
argument in favor of this approach is that these persons are equally culpable. While
this Committee is not in total agreement on the importance of this factor as a sen-
tencing criteria, it serves to highlight the conceptual difficulties with the Commis-
sion's present approach.
Comisky Letter, supra note 94, at 3. The use of the amount of unpaid tax liability as a
sentencing consideration is a matter that is addressed in more detail in Section III(B),
infra.
100 Comisky Letter, supra note 94, at 4.
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present system and can easily give rise to inequity and injustice in
sentencing.
What is the result if an offender is convicted of a conspiracy
offense, either conspiracy to evade taxes or conspiracy to impede
the Internal Revenue Service in the performance of its duties?101
Either offense can be established without proving that some amount
of tax is due and owing.'0 2 Must the amount of unpaid tax be
proven at the sentencing hearing, even though it was never an issue
at trial? If so, the sentencing hearing will of necessity become a far
more elaborate proceeding than is apparently contemplated by the
Preliminary Draft. 0 3
Because it is simply not possible to analyze every issue that
arises from the proposed tax offense guidelines, this portion of the
discussion will conclude by considering an issue that is inherent in
guideline section C212. Guideline section C212 is concerned with
the offense of "willful failure to file a return, supply information or
pay tax."' 0 4 This guideline, like so many of the others, predicates
its base offense value on the amount of the tax deficiency. 10 5  The
amount of tax that has not been paid is not, however, a necessary
element of the criminal offense of failure to file a return. To estab-
lish the commission of the offense of failure to file, the government
is only required to establish that the taxpayer had sufficient gross
101 The government can prevail by establishing the existence of either variety of con-
spiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 387 n.14 (7th Cir. 1978).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 610 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Fruehauf Corp., 577 F.2d 1038, 1071, 1072 (6th Cir. 1978).
103 See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,088. The Commentary includes the following observa-
tions on the sentencing hearing:
Factual disputes are unlikely in the vast majority of cases, for the jury will have
resolved some disputes and the presiding judge will be able to determine the pres-
ence of associated conduct from evidence produced during the course of the
trial.... If a hearing is necessary, it will be less formal than a trial... [although]
[t]he parties will have the right to present and to cross-examine witnesses.
Id. These comments are intended to illustrate that the above observations are incorrect,
at least as regards tax offense cases. As noted above, in these cases it is very likely that
the trial evidence will not conclude the factual issues that must be considered at sentenc-
ing. Aside from the other difficulties inherent in the proposed tax offense guidelines,
this factor means that they will require extensive and elaborate sentencing hearings that
can only be convened after the parties have been allowed ample time to engage in dis-
covery and pursue other preparations for litigating the issues that have not been re-
solved at the trial on the merits. At the very least, this will have a dramatic effect on the
federal judiciary's ability to handle its docket with efficiency and some level of
expedition.
104 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,095.
105 See supra note 84. Guideline § C212 uses a base offense value that is "80%o of the
offense value for Tax Evasion specified in sec. C211." 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,095. How-
ever, "[i]f the offense involved only a failure to pay tax when due, the base offense value
is [only] 50% of the base offense value specified in [§ ] C21 ." Id.
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income to oblige him to file a return. Gross income is not, however,
synonymous with "gross receipts," as was established by the hold-
ing in Siravo v. United States. 10 6
In Siravo, the court held that "total receipts must be reduced by
the cost of goods sold and other costs representing a return of capi-
tal to arrive at gross income for a manufacturing business .... ,107
Assume, for the moment, that an individual was engaged in a manu-
facturing business, and that he has been convicted of failure to file a
return. Also assume that he did not submit evidence at the trial on
an issue that is irrelevant to the point under consideration because
he was convinced that he could obtain a reversal on appeal.
What should he do at the sentencing hearing? Assuming that
he wishes to do so, and that doing so will not violate his fifth amend-
ment rights, can he re-open the issue of gross income at the sen-
tencing hearing? Can he present evidence at the sentencing hearing
of allowable costs that would reduce his gross income (a) below the
point required for filing a return, and/or (b) to a sum lower than
that alleged by the government?
In either eventuality, he will enjoy a net advantage, since the
sentence that will be imposed will be substantially reduced. The un-
resolved question, however, is whether the evidentiary issues heard
and determined at the trial on the merits become resjudicata for the
sentencing hearing. This is an issue that must be resolved because
it implicates fundamental due process concerns and goes to the en-
tire rationale of the sentencing proceeding.
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The central problem with the tax guidelines is the same prob-
lem that is encountered in connection with all of the proposed
guidelines, at least, the guidelines that have been proposed for non-
violent, "white-collar" offenses. This central problem is that the
guidelines are predicated on the proposition that they are intended
to sanction offenses based on the "actual harms" inflicted.
This proposition is at once the result of and the reason for the
Commission's decision to premise the guidelines on the concept of
"modified real offense sentencing."' 0 8 The initial Commentary uses
an example to illustrate the reasons why "modified real offense sen-
tencing" was chosen as the operative paradigm for the guidelines.
First, a man walks in a bank, hands a teller a shopping bag, pretends to
106 377 F.2d 469 (Ist Cir. 1967).
107 Id. at 473.
108 See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,085-88.
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have a gun, and passes a note that says, "I have a gun. Give me all
your money." The teller puts $1,500 in the shopping bag and the
offender walks out. Second, a man walks up to a teller in a bank and
points a loaded gun. The offender demands money. After the teller
gives him $1,500, he strikes her with the gun and demands that she
collect money from elsewhere in the bank. He leaves the bank with
$20,000. Assume that the grand jury charges both these defendants
with violations of the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and that both
are convicted. A guidelines sentencing system based solely on offense
of conviction treats these two offenders similarly.... A real offense sen-
tencing system, however, would take account of all the harms that the offender
actually caused during the course of the conduct for which he was charged. Thus,
a real offense system would punish the second man more severely in light of the
gun, the extra money taken, and the physical injury caused. 10 9
Even assuming, arguendo, that a real offense system would more
perfectly "do justice" in the situation described above, it does not
necessarily follow (a) that it applies with equal force to non-violent
offenses, and/or (b) that identical factors can be employed in assess-
ing the "harms" inflicted by violent and non-violent offenses."i 0
The central difficulty is that while modified real offense sentencing
may have an intrinsic appeal when one is confronted with an ele-
mental offense, its appeal and utility break down when it is extrapo-
lated into other categories.
In the example above, the "harms" are readily apparent on a
basic, intuitive level. In the first instance, the "harm" is theft, the
deprivation of $1,500; the deprivation is apparent even if the victim,
presumably the bank, is relatively impersonal. In the second in-
stance, the "harm" is even more readily apparent at that same intui-
tive level, namely, the use of a loaded weapon and the actual
infliction of physical injury."'
The "harm" in both instances is readily apparent because the
offenses are what might be termed "linear" offenses; that is, there is
a direct, one-to-one relationship between the offender and his vic-
tim." t 2 It is very easy to hear a description of the offense conduct
109 Id. at 35,085 (emphasis added).
110 The terms "violent" and "non-violent" offenses are necessarily imprecise but are
used in the discussion both because they refer to familiar categories and because no
particularly apt substitute is readily available. The categories are intended to denote the
conceptual distinction between what might be termed "linear" offenses, in which there
is the equivalent of a one-to-one relationship between the offender and his victim, and
"non-linear" offenses, in which there may be a definable offender but the victim cate-
gory is generalized and difficult to define with precision.
111 Presumably, the "harm" in this instance would also include some level of psycho-
logical injury, especially since this is a factor that is explicitly included in the guidelines
for violent offenses. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 35,092-93.
112 See supra note 105.
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and readily apprehend the social evil that has resulted therefrom.
This is true both because of the relatively simple nature of the con-
duct at issue and because of the fact that this is what one might term
"conventional criminal conduct." That is, it is conduct that has
been condemned at least as long as mankind has kept written
records and is, therefore, more easily comprehended, both in its
commission and in its implications.
Non-violent offenses, or "white-collar" crimes, are, however,
quite a different story. Aside from their relative novelty, they differ
from violent offenses in that both the criminal conduct and the re-
sulting "harms" are more abstract and less intuitively apparent.
The majority of "white-collar" crimes are defined as crimes because
of social policy considerations." 13 Thus, the level of "harm" in-
flicted by these crimes must be ascertained with reference to the so-
cial policy considerations that were responsible for their enactment.
The proposed guidelines beg this question by attempting to rely on
the amount of money that was involved in a particular transaction.
As was noted in the previous section, this is a poor standard and
does not adequately reflect the "evil" that the punishment is in-
tended to reach.
Perhaps an example will illustrate this point. Assume that there
was a company that was in the business of processing and providing
asbestos for use in construction and other industries. Assume, fur-
ther, that this asbestos company was aware, as long ago as 1920,
that asbestos was highly dangerous, resulting in various fatal respir-
atory diseases and a particularly malevolent form of cancer. As-
sume further that, possessing this knowledge, the company
deliberately exposed hundreds of its workers to asbestos without
providing protection that was readily available. The company chose
113 Tax offenses, for example, are defined as offenses because of social policy interests
in ensuring the timely and accurate payment of federal and state income taxes. See, e.g.,
I Internal Revenue Manual-Audit (CCH) 7291, 7293-19 through 7293-54; 2 K.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILrY § 11.01 (1984). Antitrust offenses have been
defined as criminal offenses because of a social policy commitment to free unrestrained
trade and a competitive market. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANA.LYsIs OF LAw (2d ed.
1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985). Various consumer offenses have been
defined as offenses because of rising concerns about the public's right to be guaranteed
products that meet certain minimal levels of safety and effectiveness. See, e.g., Geis, Crim-
inal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 377 (1972); McAdams, The Appropri-
ate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 989,
995-96 (1977); Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products, 73 GEo. LJ. 61
(1984). All of these criminal offenses are the result of social policy considerations that
are, at once, of relatively recent development and that result from considerations that
are far more abstract than those involved in condemning a bank robber who strikes a
helpless teller.
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not to equip its workers with such protection because to do so
would directly increase the costs of production and thereby cut
down on the company's profits. At the same time, the company was
supplying asbestos for use in literally thousands of buildings across
the country.
At some point in time, the workers and former workers realize
what has been done to them, and they initiate personal injury and
wrongful death actions against the company. At the same time, the
owners of buildings in which asbestos has been installed bring prop-
erty damage actions intended to recover the costs they will incur in
removing the asbestos and replacing it with other, less deadly
materials. Assume that the average personal injury claim is for the
sum of $150,000 and that the average property damage claim is for
the sum of $1,000,000.
Finally, assume that criminal action is instituted against the
company for its conduct in both regards. The company and its rep-
resentatives have been tried and convicted of both categories of of-
fenses. How would a "modified real offense sentencing" paradigm
choose the sanctions for each offense? Would such a system punish
the property damage conduct more severely because the transaction
costs were higher in terms of monetary considerations? If not, how
would such a system ascertain the relative levels of "harm" inflicted
by the two different types of conduct, both involving the same in-
strumentality and the same general level of culpability?
This example is intended to indicate that not all criminal con-
duct is reducible to a dollar amount. We suggest that the members
of the Commission reconsider their commitment to using finances
as a primary factor in determining the "harm" inflicted by a particu-
lar offense and in setting the punishment for the offense. Even if
one assumes, for the purposes of argument only, that financial con-
siderations are appropriate in sanctioning certain types of offenses,
this proposition is not necessarily true in regard to white-collar
offenses.
Of far more significance in the white-collar crime area are the
social policy considerations responsible for the articulation of the
offense, the forces that prompted the commission of the offense and
the offender's potential for becoming and remaining a useful, pro-
ductive member of society. Even if Congress has chosen to replace
rehabilitation as the primary goal of federal sentencing, rehabilita-
tion and the analysis that has been developed under the old system
should still play a part under the new sentencing paradigm.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article considered the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion's Preliminary Draft of the Sentencing Guidelines that are to be
implemented when the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act be-
come effective on November 1, 1987. The article points out the dif-
ficulties inherent in the Draft's reliance on the concept of "modified
real offense sentencing" and suggested that the Commission substi-
tute a "charge of conviction offense sentencing" paradigm for this
intrinsically flawed concept. We also pointed out other problem ar-
eas, including the allocation of certain burdens of proof and persua-
sion, and demonstrated why these areas must be re-evaluated if the
guidelines are to be a constitutionally permissible, and effective,
sentencing implement. Finally, this article examined the guidelines
that are proposed for tax offenses and demonstrated how they suffer
from the same evils that were considered in connection with the
general paradigm. The authors hope this article will contribute to
the re-evaluation of the Guidelines contained in the Draft, and to
the ultimate articulation of guidelines that will implement the provi-
sions of the Act in a constitutionally acceptable, pragmatically feasi-
ble manner.
